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Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the l930s
ABSTRACT
Currency depreciation in the l930s is almost universally dismissed or
condemned. It is credited with providing little if any stimulus for economic
recovery in the depreciating countries and blamed for transmitting harmful
beggar—thy—neighbor impulses to the rest of the world econonv. In this paper we
argue for a radically different interpretation of exchange—rate policy in the
l930s . We document first that currency depreciation was beneficial for the
Initiating countries. It worked through both the standard supply- and
demand—side channels suggested by modern variants of the Keynesian model. We
show next that there can in fact be no presumption that currency depreciation in
the l930s was beggar—thy—neighbor policy. Rather, an empirical analysis of the
historical record is needed to determine whether the impact on other countries
was favorable or unfavorable. We conclude provisionally on the basis of this
analysis that the foreign repercussions of individual devaluations were in fact
negative — that the depreciations considered were beggar—thy—neighbor. As we
point out, however, this finding does not support the conclusion that
competitive devaluations taken by a group of countries were without benefit for
the system as a whole. We argue to the contrary that similar policies, had they
been even more widely adopted, would have hastened recovery from the Great
Depression.




Whether they are concerned with the magnitude of the initial contraction or
the retardation of the subsequent recovery, most analyses of the Great
Depression attach considerable weight to the effects of economic policy. The
misguided actions of the Federal Reserve and the unfortunate commercial
initiatives of the Executive and Legislative Branches are blamed for
transforming the American recession into anunprecedented depression)-
Perverse monetary and fiscal responses in such countries as Germany and France
are blamed for reinforcing the deflationary pressures transmitted from the
United States to the rest of the industrial world.2 In desperate attempts if
not to promote recovery then at least to provide insulation from destabilizing
foreign shocks, national authorities took recourse to currency devaluation and
tariff escalation. Such initiatives are typically characterized as
counterproductive beggar-.thy—neigkibor policies. Individually they are seen as
attempts to better a country's position at the expense of its neighbors;
together, it is argued, they disrupted international economic relations and, by
impeding foreign trade, destroyed one of the only remaining sources of
autonomous demand.3
Despite notable exceptions, such as "cheap money" in Britain after 1931,
fiscal expansion in Sweden, and industrial policy giving way to central control
in Germany, policy receives little credit for helping the economies of Europe
find their way out from the Great Depression.b One can conceive of various
counterfactual policy packages that these nations might have pursued: the
components include devaluation, protection, monetary expansion and fiscal
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stimulus. In practice, however, there was little scope for significant policy
initiatives within the institutional and intellectual framework inherited from
the 1920s. Fiscal policy, except in Sweden, would continue to be guided by the
principle of balanced budgets until the adoption of Keynesian approaches to
taxation and spending in subsequent decades.5 Even had there existed a belief
in the efficacy of countercyclical fiscal policy, it might have been of little
practical consequence on the national level so long as the fixed parities of the
gold—exchange standard continued to serve as an external constraint. The
potential of monetary initiatives, although more widely recognized and
acknowledged, 'as equally inhibited by this gold standard constraint.
The critical decision for national economic authorities therefore concerned
the stance of external policy. Not only might currency devaluation, exchange
control, tariff protection or quantitative trade restrictions have macroeconomic
effects of their own, but by changing the external constraints they opened the
way for initiatives on other fronts. Some have argued, however, that these
policies provided a country relief from the Depression only at the expense of
its neighbors, and that by eliciting retaliation, these policies only
exacerbated the Depression for all involved. Thus, many studies of the
Depression which do not dismiss the effects of policy as negligible condemn them
as positively harmful.
In our view, a proper understanding of the role of external economic policy
must begin with a sharp analytical distinction between protectionist measures
(such as tariffs and quotas) and exchange rate management. Tariffs and
devaluation are often spoken of as two sides of the same coin, both being
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policies designed to shift demand from foreign countries to the domestic
econonw. In fact, the general equilibrium implications of the two sets of
policies are very different. Tariff changes inevitably create output •price
distortions, while a series of devaluations in many countries can leave relative
output prices unchanged. (Exchange control is effectively a combination of
tariff and devaluation policy, in the sense that it both changes the relative
prices of national currencies and causes distortions in output prices.) On
tariffs, we endorse the traditional view: a tariff escalation in one country is
likely to reduce economic welfare in other countries and provoke retaliation;
and a global round of tariff escalation is likely to reduce welfare in all
countries.6 When it comes to exchange rate management, the implications are far
more complex. One country's devaluation need not beggar the remaining countries,
and a series of devaluations can easily leave all countries better off.
We will argue that currency depreciation ias clearly beneficial for the
initiating countries. In this regard, our work supports the findings of Choudri
and Kochin (l98O). Even this point is controversial, since it has recently
been argued, in the spirit of the new classical macroeconomics, that the effects
of depreciation were in some instances negligible.8 The new classical
macroeconomics insists that pure monetary changes in an econbnw, such as a
change in the nominal value of gold, can have no real effects since all other
nominal prices will merely adjust to the monetary change. We believe that the
experience of the l930s provides a wonderful case to refute this dogma.
Somewhat more controversial are our conclusions concerning the foreign
repercussions of depreciation and the impact of competitive devaluation. After
showing that currency depreciation was clearly beneficial for the initiating
country, we show that there is in fact no theoretical presumption that
depreciation in the l930s was a beggar—thy—neighbor policy. To determine
whether the impact on other countries was favorable or unfavorable, one must
turn to the historical record. Although we do find evidence that the foreign
repercussions of individual devaluations were negative — that policy had
beggar—thy—neighbor effects —— this finding does not support the conclusion that
competitive devaluations taken by a group of countries were without benefit for
the system as a whole. Although it is difficult to determine whether the
devaluations which actually took place had on balance an expansionary or
contractionary impact on the world econony, there is little doubt that similar
policies, had they been adopted even more widely and coordinated
internationally, would have hastened economic recovery from the Great
Depression.
I
What are the principal channels through which the currency depreciations of
the l930s could have affected domestic and foreign economies? Our analysis
focuses on three potential channels of transmission from policy to performance:
real wages, international competitiveness, and the level of world interest
rates. In Appendix A we present a simple two—country model, drawing on the
work of Mundell (1964) and Fleming (1962) but extended to encompass the
determinants of aggregate supply and the gold—standard constraints, which can be
used to analyze formally the role of these variables in linking together
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currency depreciation and economic growth. However, the effects of these
variables can be readily understood without recourse to this formal model.
We have in mind a model of national economies linked together by
international flows of commodities and assets. We adopt Keynes'
characterization of labor and output markets: in each country nominal wages
adjust only slowly due to inertia in labor markets, but prices adjust with
sufficient speed to clear commodity markets. Aggregate supply in each country
depends on profitability, as measured by the ratio of product prices to wages.
Thus, we assume the standard upward—sloping supply curves suggested by economic
theory. Aggregate demand in each country depends on competitiveness (or the
ratio of domestic to foreign prices) and on interest rates (which determine the
division of spending between current and future periods). As in the
Mundell—Fleming model we take money demand to be a function of output and
interest rates, where the latter are linked internationally by the open interest
parity condition. For the present we neglect expectations of exchange—rate
changes; hence domestic and foreign interest rates can be taken as equal, and we
need make no distinction between real and nominal interest rates.
In such a model, currency depreciation will increase output and employment
in the devaluing country. By raising the price of imports relative to domestic
goods, it switches expenditure toward the home country. This increased domestic
demand will tend to drive up domestic commodity prices, moderating the stimulus
to aggregate demand and by reducing real wages stimulating aggregate supply,
until the domestic commodity market clears. The same shift in relative prices
that switches demand toward domestic goods switches demand away from foreign
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goods, exerting deflationary pressure on the foreign econon. However, whether
currency depreciation is beggar—thy—neighbor policy depends not only on
adjustment in commodity markets but on conditions in asset markets as well. The
devaluation will tend to reduce world interest rates and thereby stimulate
demand in the foreign country. The stimulus from lower interest rates can
exceed or fall short of the contractionary shift of demand away from foreign
goods and towards the devaluing country. Thus foreign output may rise or fall
after the devaluation.
The overall impact on foreign economies depends on the home—country
measures that accompany devaluation. The devaluing country's central bank gold
reserves rise in value by the extent of the devaluation. This capital gain can
be put to various uses by the central bank. If the monetary base is expanded by
the percentage devaluation, the gold backing of the base remains unchanged (with
gold valued at the new parity).9 Alternatively, the central bank might choose to
leave the monetary base unchanged, in which case the effective gold backing
rises. This is the case when capital gains on gold are transferred to the
treasury and then used to retire treasury debt held by the central bank. Thus,
devaluation may be accompanied by a corresponding rise in the monetary base, by
a rise in gold cover, or by some combination of the two.
The greater the accompanying expansion in monetary base, the more likely is
a rise in foreign output after the devaluation. World interest rates fall
further, and this fall in world interest rates provides the stimulus needed to
expand foreign demand. It is theoretically ambiguous whether the favorable
impact on the foreign country of lower interest rates outweighs the unfavorable
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effects of its loss of competitiveness. We show in Appendix A that a necessary,
though not sufficient, condition for a positive "locomotive effect" is that the
foreign country gains gold reserves and the devaluing country loses gold
reserves after the devaluation. Thus, if the devaluing country keeps the
monetary base tight enough to prevent any loss of gold reserves, devaluation is
surely beggar—thy—neigimor.
Clearly, our analysis is premised on a framework in which monetary
variables are non—neutral. Before becoming deeply enmeshed in analysis it is
important therefore to pause and consider whether this is an appropriate
framework for analysis. We show in Figure 1 an example of the relationships
which led us to this perspective (all data employed in this paper are detailed
in Appendix B). Figure 1 shows the relationship of the percentage change in the
exchange rate between 1929 and 1935 to the percentage change in industrial
production over the same period. We choose 1935 as the terminal date in order
to permit exchange—rate changes as much time as possible to work their effects)-°
We include all the economies of Western Europe for which compoarable data could
be obtained)-' The change in exchange rates, plotted along the horizontal
axis, is expressed as the gold price of domestic currency in 1935 as a
percentage of the 1929 parity; a value of 100 for France indicates no
change in the rate, while a value of 59 for the United Kingdom indicates a 141
percent depreciation. The change in industrial production, plotted along the
vertical axis, is the ratio of production in 1935 to 1929 multiplied by 100.
There is a clear negative relationship between the height of the exchange rate





Note: The exchange rate is in units of gold per unit of domestic currency.
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represented here by- France, the Netherlands and Belgium, had by 1935 failed to
recover to 1929 levels of industrial production. Countries which devalued at an
early date (the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Scandinavian countries) grew
much more rapidly. Moreover, there appears to be a positive relationship
between the magnitude of depreciation and the rate of growth between 1929 and
1935. Germany and Belgium are outliers in terms of this relationship, Belgium
presumably because she devalued only at the end of the period, leaving
relatively little time for exchange rate changes to influence growth, and
Germany presumably because of the influence of capital controls whose effects
were analogous to an explicit depreciation.13
It can be objected that both the exchange rate and industrial production
are endogenous variables, so that we should not attribute variations in economic
growth to movements in exchange rates rather than vice versa. We prefer our
interpretation for several reasons. First is the matter of timing. In all
cases, devaluation preceeded the beginning of recovery, judged on the basis of
annual data. Second is a matter of logic. It is hard to make a case for
reverse causation, that faster growing countries were pushed into devaluation.
Indeed, we will demonstrate that the faster growing countries were absorbing,
not losing, gold, so that it would be tricky indeed to make the case that fast
growth forced countries off their gold parities. Third, and most important,
exchange rates in the 1930s depended not just on economic pressures but on
national attitudes toward the monetary standard, where the latter are
predetermined relative to the events of the early 1930s. Countries' allegiance
to their gold standard parities appear to have been largely a function of their
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stabilization experiences in the early 1920s. Ironically, those nations which
made the most concerted efforts to restore prewar gold standard parities in the
early 'twenties showed the least hesitation to devalue in the early 'thirties.
Conversely, those countries which failed to restore prewar parities in the
'twenties, typically in the wake of an inflationary episode varying from the
moderate to the extreme, made the most strenuous efforts to defend and maintain
the gold parities which they finally established. The obvious contrast is
between Britain and France, although the point applies generally. French
opinion was so traumatized by the successive "battles of the franc" that took
place between 1922 and 1926 that neither the public nor policymakers were
willing to even contemplate the option of devaluation before 1936.11t In Britain,
where the decision to return to the prewar parity was little questioned in 1925,
there was nearly no mention of a return to the gold standard once convertibility
was suspended in the wake of the 1931 financial crisis.15 The important point
for our analysis is that the decision of whether to devalue the currency in the
1930s was heavily influenced by considerations exogenous to our macroeconomic
model, namely the historical experience of the 1920s.
Figures 2 through 5 show various aspects of the mechanism linking exchange
rates to economic activity. In Figure 2 the change in real wages (on the
horizontal axis) is plotted along with the change in industrial production (on
the vertical axis). The clear negative relationship indicates that supply
considerations strongly influenced the rate of economic recovery.16 Countries
which succeeded in reducing real wages enhanced profitability and boosted























































late date of devaluation there left little time for its effects. Figure 3,
which shows the relationship between the change in the exchange rate and the
change in the real wage, suggests that depreciation, by putting upward pressure
on prices, contributed to the reduction in the real wage which stimulated supply
in devaluing countries.17 Of course, other factors in addition to exchange—rate
policy influenced the evolution of real wages. These other factors appear to
have played relatively large roles in Germany, Italy, Finland and France. In
Italy and especially in Germany, the labor market came under increasingly strict
government regulation as the l930s progressed; it is not surprising that the
change in real wages only moderately reflects the market forces we consider.lB
The extent to which French wage growth was stimulated and Finish wage growth
restrained by factors other than external economic policy is an important topic
for further research.
The impact of exchange rate changes on demand is apparent in Figure 4,
where the change in the exchange rate is plotted along with the change in export
volume (expressed in ratio form). The negative relationship is undeniable:
countries which depreciated succeeded in promoting the recovery of export
volume, compared with countries that remained on gold.19 This result may or may
not be consistent with the beggar—thy—neighbor characterization of exchange—rate
policy, but it clearly shows that a single devaluation, taken in isolation,
increased demand in the devaluing country. The same picture would emerge were
we to construct measures of' the real exchange rate and plot them against export
volume, since each country's real exchange rate is dominated by the movement of
its nominal exchange rate. In Figure 4, France and Finland are the noticeable
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these countries to be outliers (in Figure 3) in terms of wage performance.
The other major channel through which exchange—rate changes could have
influenced demand is via the level of interest rates. Countries that devalued
could have taken advantage of the relaxation of gold—standard constraints and•
engineered a reduction in interest rates through the adoption of accomodative
money and credit policies. In our formal model, depreciation and accompanying
monetary initiatives affect only the overall level of world interest rates. In
a more general model, depreciation might give rise to interest—rate
differentials among countries, creating not only the expenditure—changing effect
emphasized in Appendix A but also an additional expenditure—switching effect.
In practice it is difficult to marshall evidence concerning the impact of
exchange—rate policy on interest rates. Interest rates on assets with even
approximately comparable maturities and risk characteristics are available for
only a subset of European countries.20 In Figure 5 we therefore plot the change
in the exchange rate along with the change in the central bank discount rate.
Obviously, the discount rate is an administered price rather than a direct
measure of market conditions. Yet in market economies the discount rate could
not diverge markedly from freely—determined rates, since central banks sihich
discounted the eligible paper of the private sector could not afford to do so at
rates far out of line from market levels. Figure 5 suggests a positive
relationship between the height of the exchange rate and the discount rate, once
account is taken of the extent of controls in Italy and Germany.2 When
currencies were devalued, central banks were able to capitalize on the increased
strength of the external position by reducing interest rates.
Figure 5






























Together this evidence suggests that the relationship between exchange—rate
changes and economic recovery depicted in Figure 1 is not a spurious
correlation. The new classical dogma of short—run monetary neutrality seems to
be decisively refuted by the data. Exchange—rate policy promoted growth not
through one but through each of the major channels: by reducing real wages,
enhancing competitiveness, promoting exports, and permitting a reduction of
interest rates. Whether the gain to devaluing countries had as its counterpart
a loss to those which remained on gold —— in other words, whether this policy
was beggar—thy—neighbor —— depends on the precise form of the devaluations. We
show in the appendix the variety of forms which devaluation might take. As
described earlier, if the money supply in the devaluing country is not expanded
to reflect the capital gains on gold reserves accruing to the central bank, gold
must flow in to satisfy the growing domestic demand for money. In this case,
the reduction in world interest rates is insufficient to overwhelm the
beggar—thy—neighbor competitiveness effect. In fact, world interest rates fall
precisely because foreign activity declines to such an extent that world money
demand is reduced relative to supply. If, in contrast, the devaluing country
increases its money supply sufficiently to induce an outflow of gold, the
stimulus to demand of lower interest rates abroad will be more likely to expand
the foreign economy. A gold outflow is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the foreign expansion. Thus, the direction of gold flows provides an
indicator of whether devaluation was necessarily beggar—thy—neighbor.
In Figure 6 we plot .the change in the exchange rate against the change in

































relationship is apparent: depreciating countries gained rather than lost gold
reserves.22 Currency depreciation, if beneficial from the individual country's
point of view, was in fact beggar—thy—neighbor.
Whether the gain to the devaluing countries outweighed the loss to their
neighbors is an extremely difficult historical question. Regardless of the
answer, it remains true that these policies, had they been adopted even nore
widely and in a coordinated fashion, could have been beneficial for all the
countries involved. In our model, a simultaneous devaluation taken by all
countries nay have no immediate effects; simply raising the domestic—currency
price of gold in each country affects none of the equilibrium conditions in
goods or asset markets.23 However, if money supplies are expanded to reflect the
capital gains on gold reserves (thus holding the gold cover ratio constant),
then the reduction in interest rates stimulates activity both at home and
abroad.
The cogent criticism of exchange—rate depreciation in the 1930s is not,
therefore, that it was used unfairly, but that the policy was pursued
sporadically and was avoided altogether by some major countries. Often,
exchange rates were adjusted in the wake of a crisis, although this was not
uniformly the case.2b Financial crises shifted from one country to another,- for
each time a country known to be in a delicate position devalued, a new country
was elevated to the position of being the next one expected to fall. Nurkse
(19Wi) labels this sequential pattern the "devaluation cycle" of the l930s. The
resulting uncertainty about exchange rate stability seems to have led
international investors (including central banks) to liquidate a portion of
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their foreign exchange holdings and replace them with gold. In our model, the
effects of such actions are captured by a rise in the gold cover ratio. The
same world stock of gold can then support only a smaller money supply, raising
interest rates and exerting deflationary pressure. To the extent that demands
for gold were increased by the "sequential" or "successive" nature of the
devaluations of the l930s, the benefits of an "all—round" devaluation were
reduced.
Thus, we do not present here a blanket endorsement of the competitive
devaluations of the 1930s. While it is indisputable that currency depreciation
conferred macroeconomic benefits on the initiating country, because of
accompanying policies the depreciations of the 1930s had beggar—thy—neighbor
effects. While it is likely that currency depreciation, had it been even more
widely adopted, would have worked to the benefit of the world as a whole, the
sporadic and uncoordinated approach taken to exchange—rate policy in the l930s
tended, other things equal, to reduce the magnitude of the benefits.
As we noted in the introduction, the contrast between exchange—rate and
commercial policies provides perhaps the best perspective on how the currency
devaluations of the 'thirties should be viewed. Both depreciation and
protection, by switching expenditure toward the initiating country, exert
expansionary effects at home.25 Both depreciation and protection can have
beggar—thy—neighbor effects abroad, although in the case of exchange—rate policy
this need not be the case. But while the adoption of tariffs by all countries
is likely (by reducing producer prices, Lowering output and employment, and
creating a deadweight loss) to leave everyone worse off, coordinated devaluation
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both at home and abroad together with accomodative monetary measures will likely
leave everyone better of •26 Too often competitive devaluation and tariff
protection have been viewed interchangeably in the literature on the 1930s.21
We have suggested here that these two policies must be viewed in a very
different fashion.
II
Our purpose in this paper has been to urge a reassessment of economic
policy in the l930s. Taking the case of exchange—rate policy, we have argued
that policy exerted an important influence over the pattern of recovery from the
Great Depression. Moreover, we have indicated the channels through which policy
operated, and presented evidence as to its effects.
Given the number of unanswered questions posed along the way, our paper has
been as much an agenda for future research as a statement of results. This
research should be extended to encompass still other aspects of external
economic policy not yet mentioned. The theoretical framework can readily
incorporate the effects of fiscal policy, but the empirical analysis awaits the
construction of adequate measures of fiscal stance.26 The extent to which
devaluation invites retaliation —— strategic aspects of exchange—rate policy ——
needs to be explicitly analyzed.29 Currency depreciation was only one of several
instruments of external economic policy, along with exchange control and trade
restrictions. These instruments, which could be viewed either as substitutes or
complements both for countries initiating policy and for those contemplating
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retaliation, arid need to be analyzed in a consistent fashion. The development
of currency areas and their effects require a separate analysis. The dynamics
of adjustment to exchange rate changes —— dynamics which permit the short run
and long run impacts of depreciation to differ —— can and should be incorporated
into the model. Above all, we have taken the formulation of policy as exogenous
to our analytical framework. A full understanding of the role of policy in the




In this appendix, we present a two—country undel of ncroeconomic
equilibrium under the gold standard. The model is an adaptation of the
two-country Mundell—Fleming framework (see Mundell, 196)4; and Bruno and Sachs,
1985), with a special emphasis placed on aggregate supply behavior and on the
monetary links to gold. For simplicity, we present the case of two symmetric
economies, with identical coefficients in the structural equations.
Aggregate supply is given as a negative function of the product wage.




Thus, a is the elasticity of output with respect to the product wage. Note that
a symmetric equation, q* =
_a(w*_p*), applies for the foreign country (with an
asterisk representing foreign). We will present only the home—country equations
in the text, and show the complete, two—country model in Table A.l.
We adopt the Keynesian assumption of nominal wage rigidity:
(A.2)
With w fixed, nominal demand expansion (e.g. via a currency devaluation) raises
p relative to w, depresses w—p, and thereby raises aggregate supply.
The home country fixes the domestic currency price of gold. We let G
signify the number of ounces of gold per unit of domestic currency (i.e. hG is
the price per ounce of gold). A rise in G therefore signifies a currency
Table Al: Two—Country Model of the Gold Standard
Aggregate Supply
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111* = r* — g* —
0 = Ydr + (l_y)dr*
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revaluation, and a fall in G, a currency devaluation. Furthermore, we set
g = log G. Abroad, G* is the number of ounces of gold per unit of foreign
currency, and g* = log cPE. The exchange rate E, equal to the number of units of
foreign currency per unit of home currency, is equal to G/G*. Again, a rise in
E signifies a domestic revaluation. We also set e = log IE, so that e = g — g*.
We write aggregate demand in each country as a decreasing function of the
country's relative output price, and a decreasing function of the nominal
interest rate I (in a dynamic model, we would distinguish the nominal and real
interest rate). Thus, with domestic prices P, and foreign prices in domestic
currency P*/E, the relative price of home goods is PE/P*, or in logs,
p + g — g* — p. Aggregate demand is written as:
(A.3) q =
_ó(p+g_g*_p*) —
Now, consider the asset markets. We write the demand for money in standard
transactions—balance form:
(A)4) m—p=4q—i
Here m is the log of nominal money balances. We assume that interest arbitrage
leads to the equality of home and foreign interest rates:
(A.5) i = 1*
In a more ôomplete model, we should expand (A.5) to reflect expectations of
exchange rate changes and risk premia arising from portfolio balance
considerations.
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Under the gold standard, it is useful to measure the gold backing of the
domestic currency. Let R be the value of gold reserves held by the central
bank. With a gold price hG, the domestic currency value of the gold reserves
is simply RIG. Define 'V = (R/G)/M as the degree of gold backing of the
currency. This can be re—arranged, after taking logs, as:
(A.6)
where the lowercase variables are logarithms of uppercase counterparts. Note
that (A.6) is solely a definition, at this point. It is converted to a
statement about policy by assuming that 4J is fixed, for example, or that r is
fixed. We discuss these two alternative cases below.
The world gold stock RW is assumed to be fixed, and divided between the
holdings of the two central banks, with RW = R + R. Since dr = d log (R) =
dR/R, we have that:
(A.T) ydr + (1_y)dr* = 0
where = R/RW at an initial equilibrium.
The ftll model is written in Table Al. There are twelve equations to solve
for twelve endogenous variables: q, w, p, 1, m, r and q*, w*, p*, 1*, m*, r.
In each country, we assume that there are two policy instruments, the price of
gold (hG), and the degree of gold backing ('10. (In logs, g and 4' are the
policy instruments). In this specification, the level of money balances, in, and
the gold reserves, r, are endogenous.
We now consider five types of changes. First, the home country
undertakes a devaluation (ag < 0), but allows the gold backing L'P) to change
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enough so that reserves are unchanged (dr = o). This nay be termed a
"sterilized" devaluation. The foreign country does not undertake any policy
actions (dg* = 0 = dt*). In the second case, the home country devalues, but
with an unchanged gold backing (dg < 0, d5 = o). Again, dg* = 0 = d41*. In the
third case, both countries devalue by an equal amount, at an unchanged gold
backing (dg = dg* C 0, d5 = ds* = 0). In the fourth case, both countries
devalue by an equal amount, but sterilize the capital gains on gold reserves so
that din = dm* = 0. Finally, in the fifth, both central banks raise their gold
backing, at unchanged parities (dg = = 0, d5 = &p > o).
Case I: Sterilized Devaluation (dg C 0, dr = o)
In this case, it is easiest to reconsider the home policy instruments as r
and g (with m and ' endogenous). Since dr = 0, we have dr* = 0. Since
= r* — g* — 40, with dt* = dg* = 0 by assumption, we see that dm* also equals
zero. Upon solving the entire model we find:
dq = (i/A)[6s + 2a6(a+)]dg > 0
dq* = (Bó/A)dg C 0
d(w—p) = (—l/aA)[ô$ + 2a6(a4-)dg C 0
di = (—l/A)ro(a+)1dg C 0
where A =
—(l+6a)I(l+ôa) + a(a++)1 + a[6a$ — a(a-s-)I C 0
Thus, the devaluation raises output at home but necessarily reduces the output
abroad. As expected, the devaluation reduces the domestic product wage (so that
aggregate supply increases) and reduces the world nominal interest rate.
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Case II: Unsterilized Devaluation (dg c 0, dp = o)
In this case, gold reserves in the home country Cr) may rise or fall after
the devaluation. Since dr4 =
—Ii/Cl—i)]dr, a fall in r produces a rise in r*.
Since dm* = dr (assuming d$* = dg* = 0), it is possible that the home
devaluation raises the foreign money stock, which was ruled out in Case I. Now,
it becomes possible that dq* > 0 if the rise in r* is large enough.
Specifically,
= (—l/)IS + 2$S(a+) + r + ra(l-s-ao) + 2rao]dg > 0
dq* = (l/)[6(r+l)]dg + cYrlr*/1$ + G(a+4)1 0
dr* = (i/))E + (a1-4)] [2ô — llrdg 0
di = (l/11)[r(l+a6) + (l—F)(a+$)ó]dg 0
where
= [1/(l—Y)1{Il + 2a51 + (a+4,)[2aaó + > 0
r = i/Cl—i)
Note that if dr* < 0 then dq is necessarily negative for dg < 0. In other
words, dr* > 0 is a necessary condition for dq* > 0. Clearly, dr* > 0 is not a
sufficient condition, since dq* can still be negative even when dr* > 0. An
example of positive transmission of the devaluation is for 6 and S very small.
With 6 = S = 0, for example, dq4 = dr*/(a+t) and dr* = —idg > 0.
Case III: Simultaneous Devaluation, Unchanged Gold Backing
(dg = dg* < 0, diP = = o)
In this case, the devaluation is expansionary for the world as a whole, and
reduces product wages and nominal interest rates. By symmetry, neither country
gains or loses reserves. Specifically,
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dq = dq* = (—u/A)dg ) 0
di = (l/A)dg < 0
d(w—p) = (a/aA)dg < 0
where A = + a(a-l-cl) >0
Case IV: Simultaneous Devaluation, Unchanged Monetary Base
(dg = dg* < 0, din = dm* = o)
In this case, the devaluation has no effects on output or interest rates.
The only effect is a rise in gold backing of each country's monetary base.
dg = dg* = 0
di = 0
d(w—p) = 0
Case V: Simultaneous Rise in Gold Backing (dg = dg4 = 0, diP = diJS > 0)
The rise in * and ijS causes a proportionate fall in the monetary base,
dm = dm* =
—d4 =_dtp*. This monetary contraction has effects exactly opposite to
the effects of simultaneous devaluation in Case III:
dqdq*= (—a/A)d$<0
di = (l/A)dip > 0
d(w—p) = (a/aA)dip > 0
where A = + a(a+4) > 0.
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Appendix B
All series used in our empirical analysis are normalized to 100 in 1929.
Definitions and sources of these data follow.
1. Industrial production: National indices of industrial production, from
Mitchell (1975) and Methorst (1938).
2. Exchange rate: Gold value of currencies as a percentage of 1929 gold
parity, from League of Nations (1938).
3. Real wage: Nominal wage deflated by wholesale price index. Wages, from
Mitchell (1975), measure hourly, daily or weekly wages, depending on
country. Note that wages for Belgium are for males in transport and
industry only, that wages in France are for men only. Wholesale price
indices are from Mitchell (1915).
4. Export volume: Special trade, merchandise only, measured in metric tons,
from League of Nations (1936, 1937).
5. Discount rate: From League of Nations (1931).
6. Gold reserve: Gold stock valued in constant dollars of 1929 gold content,




1. The classic indictment of the Fed is of course Friedman and Schwartz
(1963). For analyses which emphasize also the effects of protectionist
initiatives, see Meltzer (1976) and Saint—Etienne (19814).
2. See for example Kindleberger (1973), Hardach (1916) and Sauvy (19814). We
do not mean to imply that the Great Depression in Europe was solely a
reflection of the downturn in the United States. (On Europe's difficulties
in the 1920s, see Svennilson (19514) or Teinin (1971).) All that is necessary
for our argument is that the Depression n Europe was heavily affected by
concurrent developments in America. Space limitations unfortunately do not
permit us to address the causes of the Depression in Europe.
3. The beggar—thy—neighbor argument so appears widely in the literature that its
origins are difficult to trace. For a reasoned statement of this view, see
Nurkse (191414).
4. Even these cases have been disputed. Jonung (1981) has questioned the role
of fiscal policy in Swedish growth, while Beenstock, Griffiths and Capie
(1984) have attempted to show that policy had little role in Britain's
recovery. The German situation is in many ways special and will be given
relatively little attention here.
5. There exists a large literature on the extent to which public officials,
especially in Britain, may have been converted to Keynesian views in the
1930s. See for example Howson and Winch (1977), Peden (1980) and Booth
(1983). Similarly, there exists a literature on the extent to which rear—
mainent expenditures in the 1930s provided effective fiscal stimulus(Thomas, 1983); it is unclear, however, whether these programs should be
viewed as macroeconomic policy.
6. See Johnson (1953—514) for one of the original game—theoretic analyses of
tariff wars. Johnson shows that all countries suffer from a tariff war
with retaliation if their economies are symmetric, while some countries
may be better off, relative to free trade, in an asymmetric environment.
7. Choudri and Kochin document the relationship between exchange depreciation
and relative national price levels and outputs for several European
countries. They do not, however, work with a formal macroeconomic model,
as we do in this paper, and thus they do not attempt to describe the
structural mechanisms linking exchange rates with other aggregate
variables. They also do not discuss the foreign repercussions of exchange
rate changes.
8. Beenstock, Griffiths and Capie (19814), passim.
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9. To keep the percentage of gold backing unchanged, open market operations
are required not just to inject into circulation currency in the amount of
the capital gains on gold reserves but also to increase the domestic credit
component of the monetary base by the proportion of devaluation.
10. Still later dates are undesirable because by 1936 all countries had
devalued and there hence remain no gold standard countries with which to
compare, but also because the course of recovery becomes increasingly
dominated by rearmament expenditure.
11. We purposely excluded the United States on the grounds that the Depression
to a large extent originated there rather than being imported from abroad
and therefore would have had very different implications for the
characteristics of both the downturn and the recovery. We did no
experimentation with different samples of countries but hope to increase
the size of the sample in future work.
12. The relationship is statistically significant at standard confidence
levels. The regression line shown in Figure 1 is derived from the
equation:
IPl935 = 153.9 — 0.69 ER1935
—'2(10.06) (3.51) B =
.56
where t—statistics are shown in parentheses. The critical values are 2.31
and 3.36 at the 95 and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively.
13. Belgium's participation in the Gold Bloc and her decision to leave in 1935
are discussed in detail by van der Wee and Tavernier (1975). A detailed
description of German exchange control is provided by Ellis (1941).
14. French opinion on monetary and financial questions, along with British corn—
parisons, is reviewed by Perrot (1935). Political aspects of the French
debate are ably summarized by Sauvy (1984).
15. The definitive analysis of the decision to return to par in 1925, which
highlights the role of the few dissenters such as Keynes, is Moggridge
(1969). An account which emphasizes the implications of the 1925 decision
for attitudes toward depreciation in 1931 is Cairncross and Eichengreen
(1983).
16. The regression is:
1P1935 = 175.2 — 59.8 (wAGE1935fwpIl935)
(i.) (3.14) =
.50
A variety of instrumental variables estimates, designed to better
distinguish the aggregate supply and demand curves, show basically the
same relationship.
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17. The regression is:
WAGE1935/WP11935 = 0.73 — 0.0065 ER1935
(3.00) (2.07) =
.27
18. Control of the German labor market has been analyzed by Nathan (l9liti) and,
more recently, by Kim (1983).
19. The regression is:
EXPVOL1935 = 1.39 — 0.0075 ER1935
(8.30) (3.6) = .55
20. The available interest rate series are neatly sunnnarized in League of
Nations (1938).
21. The absence of the conventional relationship in German and Italy reflects
both the imposition of exchange controls in Germany and increasingly
draconian measures designed to circumvent both domestic and international
capital markets. The regression line is:
ACBDR =
—1t.77 + o.obo ER1935 — 2.31 GEEMANY — 1.55 ITALY
(s.i) R.l9) (2.73) (1.92)
22. The regression is:
GOLDCR1935 = 2.U0 — 0.018 ER1935
(.8) (2.79)
=
23. We should stress immediate effects. By raising the price of gold in terms
of commodities, an increased flow supply of new gold could be elicited in
the long run. For contemporary discussion of this mechanism, see Gold
Delegation (1932).
21k. An obvious contrast is between the successive financial crises in Austria,
Germany and Britain in the summer of 1931, which gave rise to either
devaluation or the imposition of exchange control, and the voluntary
decisions of many of the countries which decided to follow Britain off gold
in the course of subsequent months.
25. For a formal analysis of these effects, see Eichengreen (1981).
26. The precise conditions under which tariffs—cum—retaliation nay actually
increase output and employment both at home and abroad are discussed by
Eichengreen (19Ba).
27. Revealingly, the devaluations of the 'thirties were often referred to as
"exchange—rate protection."
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28. To date, constant employment measures of the government budget have been
constructed only for the United States and Britain. See Brown (1956) and
Middleton (1981).
29. Eichengreen (l9Wtb) presents an analysis of' strategic behavior under the
interwar gold standard, but only for the fixed exchange nte case.
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